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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-1892 
____________ 
 
MARTIN R. CZECK, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DONNA ZICKEFOOSE, Warden 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 1-10-cv-04668) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 29, 2012 
 
Before:  SMITH and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,*
 
 District Judge. 
(Filed:  June 29, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
                                              
* The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, District Judge for the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Martin Czeck (“Czeck”) appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his 
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for lack of jurisdiction.  For the reasons set forth below, 
we will affirm. 
I. 
 We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 In 1996, Czeck was convicted of various drug and firearms offenses in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Minnesota, and pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal 
Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), he was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment.  The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction and 
sentence on January 30, 1997.  Czeck subsequently filed a timely habeas petition under 
28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied.  Between 1999 and 2002, he filed three applications 
seeking authorization to file a successive § 2255 habeas petition, all of which were 
denied. 
 Czeck then sought relief in Minnesota state court, seeking to have various criminal 
convictions from the 1980s set aside.  He was successful in getting four convictions from 
1981 and 1982 vacated.  Thereafter, in 2005, Czeck filed a motion for reduction of 
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582, arguing that because four of his state court 
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convictions were vacated, he was “actually innocent” of being an “Armed Career 
Criminal.”  The District Court denied the motion.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reasoning 
that even if Czeck’s motion was treated as a successive § 2255 petition, it was untimely 
because he did not diligently pursue his state court remedies until six years after his 
federal conviction.  United States v. Czeck, 172 F. App’x 687 (8th Cir. 2006).  Czeck 
subsequently filed a § 2241 petition in the Southern District of Illinois, which was denied 
for lack of jurisdiction, and two more applications seeking to file successive habeas 
petitions under § 2255, both of which were denied.  In 2010, he filed a second § 2241 
petition, this time in the District of Minnesota, again attacking the legality of his sentence 
based on the vacated state convictions.  The District Court held that Czeck could not seek 
relief under § 2241 because he had not established that § 2255 was inadequate or 
ineffective.  The Court reasoned that: 
“the ‘inescapable implication’ of the Eighth Circuit’s finding that Czeck 
did not provide a sufficient excuse for waiting six years after his federal 
conviction became final to petition the state court for relief was that Czeck 
could have raised the issue of [his state] convictions in a § 2255 challenge 
to his sentence had he acted more diligently.” 
 
Czeck v. United States, 2010 WL 1526550, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 2010). 
 
 On September 13, 2010, Czeck filed the instant § 2241 petition in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of New Jersey, his present district of confinement.  The District 
Court denied the petition sua sponte, reasoning that it lacked jurisdiction to consider 
Czeck’s challenge to the legality of his sentence under § 2241 because he had not 
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demonstrated that a motion under § 2255 would have been inadequate or ineffective.  
Czeck filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over a district court’s dismissal of a habeas petition for lack 
of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  “We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its factual 
findings.”  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation 
omitted). 
III. 
 A federal prisoner must generally challenge the legality of his conviction or 
sentence through a motion filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Id. at 120.  A § 2255 
petition must be brought in the court that imposed the sentence within one year from the 
date the judgment of conviction became final.  28 U.S.C. § 2255.  However, the “safety 
valve” clause of § 2255 allows a petitioner to seek a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 
in the “rare case,” in which a § 2255 petition would be “inadequate or ineffective to test 
the legality of his detention.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 250 
(3d Cir. 1997).  “Section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because the 
sentencing court does not grant relief, the one-year statute of limitations has expired, or 
the petitioner is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements” of § 2255.  
Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002).  Rather, a § 2255 
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petition is inadequate or ineffective “only if it can be shown that some limitation of scope 
or procedure would prevent a Section 2255 proceeding from affording the prisoner a full 
hearing and adjudication of his claim of wrongful detention.”  United States v. Brooks, 
230 F.3d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).  For example, we held in In re 
Dorsainvil that § 2255’s safety valve clause is triggered where, subsequent to a prisoner’s 
direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct 
for which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal.  119 F.3d at 251.  In 
such a situation, the prisoner’s earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction was 
inadequate, and relief is available under § 2241 in order to avoid a “complete miscarriage 
of justice.”  Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)). 
 In this case, § 2255 was the proper vehicle for Czeck to raise the argument that his 
ACCA sentence is no longer valid because four of the convictions upon which his 
sentence was based have been vacated.  He argues that § 2255 was “inadequate or 
ineffective” to challenge his ACCA sentence because he did not discover that there were 
grounds to vacate his state convictions until after his first § 2255 petition had been filed 
and denied.  We disagree.  As the Eighth Circuit noted, Czeck waited for six years after 
his federal conviction was finalized to seek relief in state court.  Czeck, 172 F. App’x at 
687.  Under such circumstances, where Czeck failed to pursue the issues related to his 
state convictions in a timely and diligent manner, § 2255 was not “inadequate or 
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ineffective.”1
IV. 
  Therefore, the District Court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction 
over Czeck’s § 2241 petition. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
                                              
1 We note that, although the District Court did not rely on 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a), it 
could have also dismissed Czeck’s habeas petition pursuant to that statute on the grounds 
that “the legality of [his] detention ha[d] been determined by a judge or court of the 
United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus.”  See Queen v. Miner, 
530 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (making clear that § 2244 applies to any 
application for a writ of habeas corpus if the issues raised in the current petition were, or 
could have been, decided in the previous habeas action). 
